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Many commentators portray the Human Rights Act (HRA) as marking the demise of 
Britain’s `Political Constitution’. This article argues otherwise. The HRA need not hand over 
supremacy for rights adjudication from the legislature to the courts. First, the HRA brings 
‘rights home’, strengthening in certain respects domestic rights instruments vis-à-vis the 
ECHR. Second, sections 19 and 4 of the Act maintain and potentially enhance Parliament’s 
scrutiny of rights and its sovereignty over the courts in defining and upholding them. Finally, 
section 3 and rights-based judicial review more generally can be assimilated to a system of 
‘weak’ review whereby courts defer to the legislative ‘scope’ determined by Parliament and 
are restricted in their independent determinations to the judicial `sphere’ of the fair conduct of 
the case at hand. Such ‘weak review’ has always been necessary. However, the HRA 
potentially reinforces judicial deference by giving it a stronger statutory basis. That the HRA 
could strengthen rather than undermine political constitutionalism need not mean it does or 
will do. However, the implication of this article is that it ought to be regarded as so doing, 
with the judiciary acting accordingly. 
 
 
The UK has long presented scholars of constitutionalism with a puzzle.
1
 Despite never having 
had an entrenched written constitution, it can claim to be the inspirer and originator of two 
key elements of modern `legal constitutionalism’: the separation of powers and a bill of 
rights. Book XI Chapter 6 of Montesquieu’s  De l’Esprit des Loix, which drew on English 
sources and took the English constitution as its model, is commonly regarded as the urtext  of 
the former, while the 1689 Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Settling 
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the Succession of the Crown offered the template for the latter. Yet,  from more or less the 
same period, ‘parliamentary sovereignty’  emerged as the distinctive constitutional feature of 
the UK  – a characteristic that commentators from the late eighteenth century onwards have 
believed negated, or at least trumped, both of these attributes of a legal constitution. As 
Dicey, who became this doctrine’s chief ideologist, famously (and approvingly) noted, there 
is ‘in the English constitution an absence of those declarations or definitions of rights so dear 
to foreign constitutionalists’.2 With the highest court part of the House of Lords and the Lord 
Chancellor a member of the executive, judicial separation was also partial True, some 
commentators – notably Tom Paine – considered these British peculiarities effectively meant 
that the UK had no constitution at all.
3
 On this account, the paradigm of constitutionalism had 
passed from Britain to the United States. But from Edmund Burke onwards, a host of 
defenders of the Westminster system have regarded it as offering a distinct and superior 
model of ‘political constitutionalism’ that protects British liberties far more effectively than 
the paper parchment of a `legal constitution’ might.  
Has this all changed with the Human Rights Act (HRA) and the subsequent creation 
of a Supreme Court separate from Parliament and government, which to some degree it 
prompted? Passed in 1998, the HRA empowers courts to review legislation for compliance 
with the rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) – albeit in 
what has been called a ‘weak’ form that does not allow courts to disapply the law, but does 
require them to either interpret legislation in complaint ways or declare it to be incompatible.
4
 
Many scholars have regarded this development as the most significant of the various 
constitutional reforms carried out in the UK over the past decade.
5
 However, the precise 
nature of that significance remains a matter for dispute. Some have regarded it as ‘an 
unprecedented transfer of political power from the executive and legislature to the judiciary’, 
that for either good or ill has undermined parliamentary sovereignty, the capstone of the 
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UK’s political constitution, and replaced it with a legal constitution.6 Others, though, have 
seen it as either compatible with – even an extension of – the UK’s political constitution,7 or 
at least as a typical British compromise between political and legal constitutionalism.
8
   
Meanwhile, a few – among them members of both these camps – have wondered, albeit for 
different reasons – whether any of it matters.9 A number even maintain that despite 
appearances legal constitutionalism always has played a crucial and, in many respects, 
ineliminable role within the British constitution.
 
These developments simply formalise that 
fact.
 10
 
In what follows, I shall attempt to assess these various points of view. The assessment 
is not so much descriptive as analytical and normative. My aim is less to assess if current 
judicial practice suggests the HRA is compatible with a distinctively political conception of 
the constitution and more to explore if it could be so. Such an exercise seems worthwhile for 
the following reason: if such an account could not be given, then the political constitution 
would be dead - if, indeed, it had ever been alive
11
 - and could only be revived by repealing 
or considerably amending the HRA (something, as we shall see, that is dismissed as 
impossible by some, though advocated at the last election by the Conservative Party).
12
 Like 
other proponents of political constitutionalism, I would find such a conclusion disturbing 
given that our objections to legal constitutionalism arise not from opposition to human rights 
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but because we regard political means as offering securer safeguards for them. Consequently, 
it ought to be possible to reconcile political constitutionalism with something like the HRA’s 
attempt to enumerate them in an ordinary statute and offer qualified protection by the courts.  
I should note that some have seen the HRA and parallel developments in other 
commonwealth countries as giving rise to a new model of constitutionalism that balances 
legal and political constitutionalism in a novel way that offers an alternative to both.
13
 By 
contrast, I believe it is more accurate to say that just as different forms of legal 
constitutionalism give greater or lesser weight to the legislature and popular sovereignty in 
amending or deciding constitutional questions, so different forms of political 
constitutionalism have allowed greater or lesser degrees of judicial independence and 
discretion. Both kinds of constitutionalism allow for some balance and there is nothing new 
in that.
 14
  The crux is where supremacy lies – with the legislature, as political 
constitutionalists desire, or the judiciary, as legal constitutionalists wish, and how far does 
that make judicial deference to Parliament a central feature of how judges conceive of their 
role. On this account, therefore, the crucial test with regard to the HRA from a political 
constitutionalist perspective is whether or not it renders legislative supremacy redundant.
15
 
My central claim is that it need not do so. 
I start with a brief outline of political constitutionalism.  Subsequent sections then 
argue that the HRA need not, as a matter of either logical or practical necessity, replace it 
with legal constitutionalism – indeed, it potentially buttresses the role of Parliament. First, the 
HRA brings ‘rights home’, strengthening in certain respects domestic rights instruments vis-
à-vis the ECHR. Second, sections 19 and 4 of the Act maintain and even enhance 
Parliament’s scrutiny of rights and its sovereignty over the courts in defining and upholding 
them. Finally, section 3 and rights-based judicial review more generally can be assimilated to 
a system of ‘weak’ review whereby courts defer to the legislative ‘scope’ determined by 
Parliament and are restricted in their independent determinations to the judicial `sphere’ of 
the fair conduct of the case at hand. Such ‘weak review’ has always been necessary. 
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However, the HRA arguably reinforces judicial deference by giving it a stronger statutory 
basis. 
 
Political Constitutionalism 
Within the British context, political constitutionalism has hitherto been associated with the 
seminal article of J. G. A. Griffith
16
  and seen mainly as a description of the UK political 
system.
17
 More recently, a number of scholars have sought to stress its normative aspects and 
deeper historical roots and to offer it as a more generally applicable jurisprudential model 
rather than just a defence of the peculiarities of the British constitution.
18
 Although there are 
significant differences between these various accounts in terms both of focus and starting 
point, these divergences can largely be put to one side for the purposes of this article. My 
primary objective here is to consider the plausibility of political constitutionalism in practice 
and only secondarily to defend its normative attractions.
19
 To this end, I shall offer an ‘ideal 
type’ of political constitutionalism that draws together the convergent descriptive and 
normative elements of the various versions on offer and briefly indicate how this model could 
be presented as offering a plausible view of the constitutional potential of the UK political 
system pre-HRA. 
 Five key and related features characterise the ‘ideal type’ of political 
constitutionalism. First, political constitutionalists contend there are reasonable 
disagreements about constitutional essentials, including rights. Among other matters, we 
disagree about the sources of rights – their philosophical foundations; the subjects of rights, 
or who possess them, where and when; their status with regard to other values, such as utility; 
their scope – how far given rights might extend and create obligations on others; the ways 
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they might be best secured; how they might be set and balanced against each other; and so 
on.
20
  
Second, as a result political constitutionalists maintain there can be no `higher’, 
rights-based constitutional law that sits ‘above’ or ‘beyond’ politics. We necessarily frame 
and apply rights-based judgments within the ‘circumstances of politics’. We may need rights 
to coordinate our collective behaviour and offer forms of protection to individuals and groups 
from the uncertainties and injustices that arise within social life, yet we differ considerably 
over what the most appropriate system of rights might be. So any system of rights has to be 
politically negotiated and will be the product of the institutional arrangements that exist to 
arbitrate these debates.
21
  
Third, and as a consequence of these first two points, they contend judicial review is 
politics by legal means. Within the UK, a prime influence on the development of what might 
be called ‘strong’ legal constitutionalism has been the work of Ronald Dworkin and his 
followers.
22
  Political constitutionalists have been particularly critical of the Dworkinian 
account of courts as a forum of principle, developing the critiques of those who have 
challenged the policy/principle distinction on which this thesis relies. They have also 
criticised Dworkin’s claim that there is a ‘right’ answer as a matter of law in ‘hard cases’ and 
his apparent inability to distinguish invocations of morality that are supposed to be legally 
binding from those that are simply cases of judges exercising discretion.
23
 By contrast, 
political constitutionalists can be broadly placed within the fold of legal positivism. 
Obviously, it is possible to be a legal positivist and still advocate a form of legal 
constitutionalism. However, political constitutionalists, as Jeremy Waldron has noted,
24
 give 
the legal positivist’s focus on the institutional sources of law an important twist. For them, 
the democratic provenance of a law forms an essential feature of its political legitimacy. 
Unlike Hobbes, for whom the kind of authority he associated with sovereignty defines law 
regardless of who that sovereign might be, the political constitutionalist believes that law-
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making, sovereign power must reside in democratic institutions that embody a plausible 
conception of political equality. Moreover, as Waldron also notes,
25
 it is important for the 
political constitutionalist not just that the source of law be democratic but also that the  
business of recognising laws by courts and lawyers be reasonably clear and open to lay  
people, not simply an arcane endeavour of the legal profession. For a democrat, the criteria of 
legal validity need to be understandable by the citizens whose property the law is. This 
concern applies particularly to the notion of judge made law – not least because of  potential 
mystifications that arise when the law seems to be a creature of judicial discretion and gets 
defined through judges exercising their private judgments about the merits of particular cases 
rather than via settled parliamentary processes. 
Fourth, political constitutionalists regard courts as being both less legitimate and less 
effective mechanisms than legislatures within working democracies, such as the UK, for 
reasoning about the most appropriate constitutional scheme of rights. They insist that it is 
important to ensure not only that the outcomes of any decision procedure embody the equal 
concern and respect for all individuals as autonomous agents that motivates contemporary 
theories of rights, but also that the process whereby such decisions get made exemplifies such 
a commitment to the equal status of citizens. Indeed, they are inclined to believe that only 
such an equality regarding process will secure appropriately equitable outcomes – or could 
legitimately resolve disagreements about what such an outcome (or process) could be. When 
it comes to both process and outcome, they claim democratic legislatures prove superior to 
courts. Two features figure particularly strongly in the comparisons political constitutionalists 
draw between the two:  the deliberative qualities of legislatures compared to courts, and the 
accountability of legislators to citizens. In both cases, political constitutionalists challenge the 
legal constitutionalist’s claims that the legal context and independence of courts are 
advantages rather than disadvantages for fair and impartial reasoning about rights.
 26
  On the 
one hand, they argue that the need for courts to accommodate both extant law and to consider 
only those parties with legal standing in the particular case, tends to make them less apt than 
legislatures to take into consideration all the moral and practical considerations relevant for 
collective decisions. On the other hand, they see the electoral accountability of legislators as 
giving citizens political equality as autonomous reasoners and sources of information about 
rights, strengthening their sense of ownership of rights decisions and enabling them to ensure 
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the full range of concerns are taken into account and appropriately weighed. In both cases, 
the electoral incentive of parties to build a coalition of voters capable of commanding a 
majority, and either to criticise and offer an alternative to the incumbent parties or defend 
themselves against such criticisms, means that a continuous balance of power exists between 
government and opposition. This balance serves to aid consideration of alternatives and curb 
abuses of power. By contrast, courts fail to offer as equal a chance to all citizens for their 
views and concerns about the collective provision and protection of rights to be counted, 
weighed and challenged. Indeed, because the law is a more restricted forum than legislatures, 
with entrenched bills of rights favouring the status quo, strong constitutional review has a 
tendency to favour the privileged over the unprivileged. As the few large n studies that have 
been carried out in this area indicate, within established democracies rights-based judicial 
review by constitutional courts has invariably been a means for blocking rather than 
promoting progressive social reform. Hegemonic groups have successfully argued that such 
measures impose coercive restrictions on individual civil rights.
27
 Indeed, the record of such 
courts as defenders of civil rights has overall proved no better and on occasion far worse than 
legislatures for similar reasons – they allow powerful interests an unequal chance to ‘trump’ 
collective decisions in the name of constitutional rights.
28
 But, as political constitutionalists 
note, if rights claims have already been ‘played’ in the legislative process, then such judicial 
‘trumping’ is an illegitimate form of double-counting. There are no trumps left to play if they 
have already been duly considered by the legislature.
29
 
Fifth, as a result of all the above, political constitutionalists affirm that the rights 
determined by legislators within legislation should be superior to the decisions of courts. 
Judicial decisions should be guided by legislation and courts should not have the power to 
strike down legislation on substantive as opposed to procedural grounds. The Supreme Court 
on constitutional issues, including rights, should be parliament. 
Two important clarifications need to be entered and underlined at this point. Both are 
crucial to the analysis of the sections that follow and the assessment of whether the HRA and 
political constitutionalism are compatible. First, as noted above,  although political 
constitutionalists are sometimes dubbed ‘rights-sceptics’ none – so far as I am aware – deny 
that individuals possess rights (even if they offer different accounts of the moral and other 
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sources of such rights).
30
 Rather, they are sceptical about rights-based constitutional review 
by courts. In fact, their position is grounded in at least one right – what Waldron calls `the 
right of rights’ - that of participating as an equal claimer of rights in collective decision-
making.
31
 The argument is premised on the view that among those who take rights and justice 
seriously, the very grounding theorists of a liberal or social democratic persuasion normally 
give for such rights – namely, that they support equal concern and respect for autonomous 
individuals – point towards prioritising their right to participate as an equal in collective 
decision making about the shape of rights in their society.  
Second, political constitutionalists do not deny that all legislation will be subject to an 
element of judicial review when applied by courts to particular cases. No law can be drawn 
up in such a detailed way that it anticipates all possible cases that might be decided with 
reference to it. Nor can judges avoid deploying what might be regarded as principles of 
natural justice in their interpretation of how the law applies. However, the decision as to 
whether legislation might be regarded per se as rights compliant, and how such compliance 
might best be achieved, ought, on their view, ultimately to rest with the legislature.
32
 
 These five features of political constitutionalism all point towards something like the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty – the view, in Dicey’s words, that Parliament possesses 
‘the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and, further, that no person or body is 
recognised … as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament.’33 They 
need not go any further than that.
34
 For example, they do not entail popular sovereignty if that 
is taken to mean a radical form of democratic self-rule, such as direct democracy. Nor do they 
point to constitutional referenda or what might be called popular constitutionalism. Not only 
do these tend to be super-majoritarian, thereby favouring what may be an unjust status quo, 
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they also fail to motivate citizens and legislators to look at rights in the round, as part of a 
programme of government that takes into account the full range of preferences on a given 
issue and the way it relates to other important issues. That purpose is best achieved via a 
system of representative democracy where all citizens can participate as equals in public 
processes that select and can hold accountable the prime power holders.  As a result, the key 
decision-makers have incentives to treat the views and concerns of those who elect them with 
equal concern and respect. The claim of political constitutionalism is that parliamentary 
democracy possesses constitutional qualities that make the fear of a populist government 
giving rise to a tyrannous majority highly tendentious. The objection to judicial review is at 
its heart an objection to the lack of such constitutional qualities within legal 
constitutionalism. These are wanting because of the absence of accountability and 
responsiveness by the judiciary, combined with the narrowness and unrepresentative nature 
of the considerations they view as relevant. These may be good qualities in ensuring 
consistency in the application of the law, but are poor qualities for making laws. Much of the 
recent debate between political and legal constitutionalists turns on how realistic as well as 
legitimate it is to see the judiciary as ultimately the servants of parliament – either ever, or 
post-HRA. It is to this issue that I now turn. 
 
The HRA: From Political to Legal Constitutionalism? 
What might be termed the basic case for regarding the HRA as an extension of political 
constitutionalism is, in formal terms, relatively straightforward. Indeed, most commentators - 
including those who believe it de facto marks a shift towards legal constitutionalism - accept 
that the drafters of the HRA went to considerable lengths to render the judicial protection of 
Convention rights compatible with the Diceyan view of parliamentary sovereignty cited 
above,
35
 which we have seen forms the key aspect of Britain’s political constitution. This 
doctrine is usually identified with two main features: first, that Parliament can legislate in any 
way or area it pleases, including if necessary amending and repealing any existing legislation, 
and, second, that no other institution may ‘disapply’ parliamentary legislation. At the 
simplest level, the HRA appears to meet the first criteria in being an ordinary piece of 
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parliamentary legislation – it has no special, entrenched status – and, as such, can be revised 
or withdrawn on the basis of a parliamentary majority. Meanwhile, as we shall see, section 4 
of the Act, which allows the court to issue a ‘declaration of incompatibility’ with convention 
rights, has been drafted so as to maintain the second criteria. For such declarations do not in 
themselves disapply the offending legislation – only Parliament can do that.  Needless to say, 
though, many commentators have found the basic position a little too simple and formal. I 
shall begin by looking at the relationship between the HRA and the ECHR and the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to see if it offers a strengthening of domestic control over 
rights congenial to a political constitutionalist. I then turn to the other main provisions of the 
HRA and explore how far a ‘weak’ form of judicial review that preserves legislative 
supremacy on rights questions is plausible.  
 
Bringing Rights Home? The HRA and the ECHR 
Some have objected that repeal of the HRA would be tantamount to withdrawal from the 
ECHR.
36
 However, although Article 1 of the Convention requires contracting states to secure 
Convention rights within their jurisdictions, it does not specify how this might best be done. 
The primary domestic mechanism need not be judicial – indeed, was not in either the UK or 
several Nordic countries for over 50 years. Of course, it might be argued that the ECHR itself 
undermines the political constitutionalist position, with the HRA simply building on that 
concession. However, formally the Convention is an international agreement between 
sovereign states from which they can withdraw or could potentially seek to renegotiate, as 
has periodically occurred when adding protocols or changing the composition and working of 
the ECtHR. This status has also allowed the UK not to sign up to all protocols to the 
Convention and to hold reservations with regard to particular Articles. Few would deny that 
withdrawal from the ECHR would have such grave consequences as to be highly unlikely – 
adversely affecting the UK’s international standing and moral legitimacy and arguably 
involving leaving the EU as well, for which adherence to the ECHR is a requirement. But 
although those advocating this position tend to be on the margins of British political life, the 
constraints on parliamentary sovereignty are political not legal and such as to leave the first 
criterion identified above intact.
37
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The second criterion might seem trickier given that the ECtHR can pass judgment on 
parliamentary legislation or administrative acts.  True, there is a certain intergovernmental 
logic in the membership and organisation of the ECtHR. Their decisions also provide for a 
‘margin of appreciation’ in the interpretation of rights – thereby conceding that while national 
governments and legislatures must all value Convention rights, their valuations of them may 
diverge to reflect local circumstances and traditions . Indeed, many clauses of the Convention 
allow the protection of individual rights to be balanced against other collective concerns such 
as public order, health and security. States may even temporarily derogate from certain 
provisions when these countervailing considerations are deemed to make it necessary to do 
so. Though the ECtHR can rule that laws or executive actions that have the sanction of 
parliament breach the ECHR, and British governments have invariably complied with such 
rulings, unlike EC Law the ECHR contains no principles of supremacy and direct effect and 
unlike the ECJ the ECtHR cannot instruct British courts to disapply rules of national law or 
interpret them in a particular way. The ECtHR can only award remedies against signatories as 
a matter of international, not domestic, law. It might be argued that even pre-HRA, though, 
the courts had begun to cite the ECHR of their own accord and risk going beyond what was 
officially permitted.
38
 However, the courts still deferred to Parliament’s explicit repudiations, 
as where the Court of Appeal judgment in the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants case 
was overruled by primary legislation the following day.
39
  So the second criterion is also met. 
Nevertheless, despite compliance of the ECHR regime with parliamentary 
sovereignty, there is no denying that the growing number of cases against the UK being 
brought before the ECtHR was felt to be an embarrassment that the HRA was in part 
designed to rectify. In this regard, many viewed the HRA as reinforcing political 
constitutionalism. The HRA would ‘bring rights home’ by offering domestic remedies that 
would reduce the need for recourse to the ECtHR.
40
 The decisions of a domestic court would 
be both less embarrassing than adverse judgments by a ‘foreign’ court and, most important, 
more in tune with the particular circumstances and traditions of the UK, including its political 
constitution. Certainly, there is good reason to believe that a national court will be more 
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subject to indirect domestic democratic pressures than an international court is likely to be. 
Even if formally independent, national courts form part of the domestic political system. 
Their membership draws on the same broad ‘political class’ as national politicians – a 
significant number of whom may even have practiced law alongside them, and the selection 
of judges is subject to various forms of direct or indirect political control and influence. 
Moreover, a far thicker public sphere exists at the national compared to the international 
level. Consequently, domestic courts come under greater scrutiny by the media and a broad 
range of interest groups, and so are more aware of public opinion than international courts. 
As a result, they tend to feel more obliged than their international counterparts to legitimise 
themselves and gain acceptance for their decisions among the wider public. As research on 
the US Supreme Court indicates, courts follow the polls – or at least sustained, national 
electoral trends. 
41
 
That said, the ECtHR continues to cast its shadow over the HRA. In particular, 
section 2 (1) of the HRA requires domestic courts to ‘take into account’ any relevant 
Strasbourg jurisprudence relating to a judgment involving a Convention right. That could be 
quite a weak instruction, strictly applying only to cases where the UK was a party. In fact, the 
courts have accorded Strasbourg jurisprudence a binding status more generally.
42
 Arguably, 
that policy follows from the aim of avoiding litigation before the ECtHR. Moreover, 
domestic courts have deferred to Strasbourg as defining what Convention rights require.
43
 
Since their role under the HRA is simply to ensure compliance with these rights, they have 
deemed it inappropriate for them to challenge or outstrip the ECtHR rulings on what an 
acceptable standard of observance involves. However, that has not meant that Parliament 
need treat ECtHR as a ‘ceiling’ rather than a ‘floor’, even if domestic courts have done so. 
Judges have simply felt (and, pace certain legal constitutionalist commentators,
44
 from a 
political constitutionalist position rightly so) that it is for Parliament rather than them to 
decide whether it wishes to elaborate legislation that goes beyond what the ECtHR deems 
necessary to protect rights. So, while the HRA does not weaken the necessity of the British 
parliament to stay compliant with ECtHR decisions, the deference of domestic courts to 
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Strasbourg also creates a potential break on their judicial activism and has arguably 
encouraged them to develop a domestic deference principle giving Parliament lee way as to 
how it might secure a given right. Though some argue such deference hinders the 
development of distinctive British human rights jurisprudence,
45
 to a degree that can 
reinforce political constitutionalism.  
However, even where the court does not go beyond the UK’s commitments under the 
ECHR, its role is to make that commitment more present and continuous. As we shall see, a 
key issue has been the recognition, in part mandated by a Strasbourg decision,
46
 that 
proportionality rather than a looser norm of reasonableness now be applied when Convention 
rights are at stake.
47
 Meanwhile, the court has acknowledged that not all ECtHR 
jurisprudence necessarily applies to the UK, having been formulated with regard to cases 
involving circumstances that do not obtain in Britain, or is always sufficiently clear or well-
reasoned as to be followable.
48
 There are also cases where as yet there is no relevant 
Strasbourg case law. For the reasons noted above, it may still remain not just symbolically or 
formally but also in many ways substantively more in line with political constitutionalism for 
such judgments to be made by a domestic rather than an international court. Even in cases 
where the court sees itself as doing no more than acting as Strasbourg would at one remove, it 
will be doing so as the agent of a UK political order and be subject to the pressures from 
Parliament and British public opinion from which, to a large extent, it derives its authority 
and legitimacy.
49
 And when it acts in cases where Strasbourg either has yet to go or has done 
so in ways that seem unclear or inappropriate, the court can give a steer that reflects the 
British context, including those circumstances that reflect its distinctive political processes. 
For example, at least some Law Lords have stressed that the HRA does not ‘authorise the 
judges to stand in the shoes of Parliament’s delegates, who are decision makers’50 The 
possibility does exist, therefore, for the HRA to ‘bring rights home’ in ways that could 
potentially strengthen political constitutionalism vis-à-vis the ECtHR. The crux is whether in 
doing so the HRA must necessarily weaken political constitutionalism in other ways and 
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move the UK ineluctably towards a legal constitutionalism, as some claim has occurred.
51
 Or 
can the Act more coherently be read as offering a way for bringing legal within political 
constitutionalism, as is generally thought its drafters intended? 
 
Parliamentary Supremacy and Weak Review 
The crucial provisions for assessing the respective roles of Parliament and the courts under 
the HRA are sections 3, 4 and 19 of the Act, and the interplay between them. Section 19 (1) 
requires the Minister in charge of a Bill to make ‘a statement of compatibility’ before the 
Second Reading `to the effect that in his view the provisions of the Bill are compatible with 
Convention rights’ or explicitly remark ‘that although he is unable to make a statement of 
compatibility the government nevertheless wishes the House to proceed with the Bill.’ 
Section 3 (1) obliges the courts to read primary and subordinate legislation, whenever 
enacted, in a way which is compatible with Convention rights ‘so far as it is possible to do 
so’. However, 3 (2) specifies `this article does not affect the validity, continuing operation or 
enforcement of any incompatible’ primary or subordinate legislation.  In these cases, where 
both a provision is deemed incompatible and the primary legislation concerned prevents the 
removal of any incompatibility, then – as I noted above -  section 4 allows the highest 
relevant courts to ‘make a declaration of incompatibility’. However, such declarations do not 
strike down offending provisions, which remain in force, operable and valid, and are not 
binding on the parties against whom they are made. The decision on whether to remedy the 
incompatibility by amending the legislation rests with the government and ultimately 
parliament, although provision is made in section 10 for a fast track legislative procedure to 
provide such remedial action. Let’s explore each of these provisions in turn. 
 
Sections 19 and 4: Upholding Parliamentary Supremacy? 
On the surface, sections 19 and 4 might appear to be straightforwardly instruments of a 
political constitutionalism. The first could be taken as offering the courts a clear indication 
that the legislation should be regarded as compatible, the second gives the last word on 
whether to revise legislation or not to Parliament. However, once again matters are not clear 
cut. With regard to section 19, courts initially paid little attention to these declarations of 
compatibility – in great part for reasons a political constitutionalist ought to approve. By and 
large, courts have been wary of according too much weight to statements by Ministers or 
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others as to what they intend by any piece of legislation.
52
 The standard case for paying 
attention to such statements is that the intentions of those who author a legislative text should 
be regarded as informing its authority. Yet, it is part of the political constitutionalist case that 
parliament and its committees allow many voices to enter into the legislative process, with 
the results the product of a dialogue between them involving the mutual modification of 
many individual positions. Therefore, the authors of legislation are not individual members so 
much as the legislative body as a whole. Given that Parliament is not a coherent, unitary 
actor, it is doubtful that it makes any sense to talk of its intentions. Least ways, the only 
sensible way we can access those intentions is by paying attention to the plain meaning of the 
legislative text itself rather by attending to individual interventions in parliamentary debates. 
A similar problem arises with the offering of reasons by legislatures. Legal constitutionalists 
sometimes contrast courts and legislators in this regard and argue as if legislation is thereby 
unreasoned. Again, the reasoning occurs in the legislative process, but the reasons of the 
legislature as a whole can only be those embodied in the legislation itself. For the reasoning 
of the individual members of the legislature may well have differed as to why the legislation 
represents an appropriate reading of rights on this matter. Like multimember courts, their 
agreements are likely to be ‘incompletely theorised’,53 the product of a convergence on a 
policy that can seem reasonable from a number of points of view.
 54
 
 Some of these difficulties have potentially been addressed by the establishment of a 
Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) two years after the HRA. The JCHR reports to 
both Houses on the compatibility question, taking evidence from Ministers, government 
departments, NGOs and legal experts, suggests amendments where it deems them necessary 
and has pushed the government towards outlining its views on this issue in the Explanatory 
Notes published with every government Bill. The reports have ensured rights considerations 
get raised in parliamentary debates and are often referred to in that context.  As a result, it 
cannot be denied that the rights enumerated in the HRA have been given due consideration in 
the framing of legislation. So, there are good grounds for regarding the legislative text as 
embodying the legislature’s due view of the balance of rights considerations with regard to a 
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given policy. Legislation is not, as some have characterised it,
55
 simply the product of the 
unprincipled trading and aggregation of interests to promote public utility regardless of its 
impact on rights. Rights and interests have both played a role in the legislative process.  
Nevertheless, two problems remain in regarding this feature of legislation as 
rendering the HRA fully compliant with political constitutionalism. First, a legal advisor 
plays a crucial role in the JCHR’s deliberations. Their advice consists largely of second-
guessing the likely judgments of the courts, be they domestic or the ECtHR. In this way, as 
Alec Stone Sweet pithily put it, ‘governing with judges’ all too often ‘means governing like 
judges.’56 Yet, as we saw, a strong part of the political constitutionalist case lies in asserting 
the superiority of legislative over judicial decision-making on the moral and political 
questions surrounding rights. To the extent parliament feels constrained by legalistic 
reasoning in its rights deliberations, this alleged advantage of political over legal 
constitutionalism is diminished.
57
 However, arguably this point proves over stated. For 
example, the Communications Act 2003,
58
 which banned political advertising in the broadcast 
media except for specially regulated party political broadcasts and party election broadcasts, 
was the subject of two reports by the JCHR, as well as being scrutinised by a specially 
appointed Joint Committee of both Houses of Parliament. As a result, Parliament believed 
that though the legislation potentially breached ECHR art. 10 concerning freedom of 
expression, they would proceed nonetheless, as permitted under section 19. Indeed, it could 
be considered that Parliament’s deliberation of the issue proved important in persuading the 
House of Lords to unanimously rule that courts should regard the law as compatible with 
ECHR art. 10 in a subsequent case.
59
 As Adam Tomkin’s has remarked, this example shows 
how Parliament can use the new procedures to influence the courts rather than the other way 
round, with the HRA promoting precisely the sort of legislative deliberation about rights 
political constitutionalists advocate.
60
 
Some commentators still feel, though, that a second and more intractable problem 
remains. For no matter how thorough and independent Parliament’s deliberations of rights 
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may be, its ability to control the judicial process remains limited. Resolving this question 
turns on how deferential the courts are or can be made to be to what Parliament decides on 
the rights question. Section 4 potentially supplies a solution in this respect, and has been 
regarded as the key provision in maintaining the political constitutionalist status quo. Thus, 
Jeremy Waldron regards the inability of courts to refuse to apply or moderate the application 
of a given law notwithstanding their view that it is incompatible with human rights as the 
hallmark of what he and others term ‘weak judicial review’.61 Waldron sees the UK as at the 
stronger end of a continuum,
62
 given that judicial declarations of incompatibility can trigger a 
legislative process of remedial action, that has New Zealand, where similar declarations have 
no such effect, at the weakest end, with Canada, where courts can disapply the law but 
legislatures can pass laws with a ‘notwithstanding’ clause that insulate them from judicial 
scrutiny, occupying a middle position – albeit one we saw is also occupied by the UK in that 
under section 19 a Minister can propose legislation that he believes to be incompatible with 
Convention rights, a power that has been employed only once thus far.
63
  
Section 4 was heralded as a core provision of the HRA. It was seen by many 
advocates of the measure as inaugurating a new model of judicial review that lay mid-way 
between political and legal constitutionalism.
64
 However, others – both legal and political 
constitutionalists – have argued that in practice there is little difference between ‘weak’ and 
‘strong’ judicial review – indeed, that the former is a chimera.65 They note that so far 
Parliament has always complied with such rulings and amended the offending legislation 
accordingly. The key point, though, is why. Four sets of reasons have been given, none of 
which is inherently incompatible with political constitutionalism.  
The first is that Parliament has exercised its prerogative. That it does so only rarely is 
neither here nor there, it remains its to exercise.
 66
 Indeed, if one takes the highest profile 
instance of a declaration of incompatibility, that of Belmarsh Prison,
67
 Parliament can hardly 
be regarded as supinely accepting the court’s decision. Though it granted the court’s 
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judgment that the current detention scheme involved unreasonable discrimination against 
non-UK citizens, it took several months to respond, adopting the new control order scheme 
following one of the longest ever Parliamentary debates. Meanwhile, the prisoners were only 
released once the new legislation was enacted so that they could be immediately re-arrested. 
Rightly or wrongly, Parliament can hardly be viewed as conceding judicial supremacy, 
therefore.  
A second reason is political culture – that any government would simply find it 
politically inexpedient to go against such a court ruling unless they were sure of 
overwhelming political support in doing so, as was the case when Roosevelt stood up to the 
Lochner era reasoning of the US Supreme Court.
68
 However, to the extent that is true – which 
given the pre-election commitment of the Conservative Party to repeal the HRA is perhaps 
highly disputable - this reasoning also is not per se incompatible with political 
constitutionalism. After all, political constitutionalists value responsiveness to public opinion 
and if a lack of popular legitimacy explains their compliance rather than a binding 
constitutional measure that literally gives them no choice in law but to comply, then 
Parliament’s deference to judicial declarations of incompatibility is in line with the political 
constitutionalist position.  
A third reason holds that where such declarations have been issued it was likely that 
the ECtHR would have made a similar ruling. A failure to comply with a declaration of 
incompatibility would give prima facie weight to any appeal to Strasbourg and increase the 
likelihood of the case going against the government.
69
 Though some have argued that where 
there is no existing case law the ECtHR might apply a wider ‘margin of appreciation’ than 
the domestic court, this is not probable. Not only, as we saw, have the domestic courts been 
guided by ECtHR standards in their judgments, but also the fact the highest domestic court 
had ruled the legislation as contravening a Convention right would almost certainly be taken 
as evidence by the ECtHR that it had done so. Nevertheless, we have seen the ECHR regime 
per se is not incompatible with political constitutionalism.  
More troubling from the political constitutionalist perspective, though, is the fourth 
reason that the court has only issued declarations of incompatibility in those cases where the 
judges concerned felt certain the government would comply. In other cases, they have used 
their power of interpretation under section 3 (1) to render legislation compatible with 
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Convention rights.
 70
 Indeed, the use of section 3 (1) has been seen by legal and political 
constitutionalists alike as the aspect of the HRA that poses the greatest potential challenge to 
parliamentary sovereignty. Many have argued that it largely undermines whatever powers 
may have been reserved to Parliament under sections 19 and especially 4.
71
 Consequently, it 
proves crucial for the political constitutionalist case to defend a plausible account of judicial 
deference and weak review in the use of section 3. 
 
Weak Review and Section 3: the Judicial `Sphere’ and Deference to the ‘Scope’ of 
Legislation 
There are three main concerns with the use of section 3 by the courts.
72
 First, some have 
worried that the injunction that all subsequent as well as preceding legislation be read as 
Convention compatible goes against the view that no Act of Parliament can bind later 
Parliaments, with later legislation involving an ‘implied repeal’ of any prior legislation with 
which it was inconsistent. Second, the ability of the judiciary to interpret legislation in a way 
they feel is Convention compatible has been seen as allowing them to effectively amend 
legislation in ways that are contrary to the clear intention of Parliament. Third, as a result, use 
of section 3 makes sections 19 and 4 largely redundant. 
With regard to the first concern, the doctrine of ‘implied repeal’, courts have always 
assumed that in the absence of an explicit repeal of, or challenge to, prior legislation, then it 
is reasonable to suppose that Parliament wished to legislate in a way that was compatible 
with existing law. As a result, they have interpreted all new laws `so far as it is possible’ as if 
that were so. Moreover, under the HRA, the declaration of compatibility under section 19 
gives the courts explicit grounds for holding that view. Of course, where they find legislation 
to be ‘incompatible’ they now have to say so explicitly. It might be argued this still replaces 
`implied’ repeal with `explicit’ repeal.73 But as we saw, such declarations do not of 
themselves disapply the law – that remains Parliament’s prerogative.  The court must 
continue to apply the disputed legislative provisions, suggesting that until such time as 
Parliament decrees otherwise Convention rights do not apply in the area covered by the new 
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legislation. As Nicholas Bamforth has argued, the HRA protection of Convention rights does 
not need to be repealed implicitly or explicitly in this case, because it is limited by the Act to 
those cases that do not fall within section 4 as being incompatible with it.
74
 
The second concern appears more problematic, for it involves the fear that section 3 
(1) will lead the courts to depart from the conventional meaning of the legislative text in ways 
that had previously been deemed inappropriate, thereby challenging the rights-based 
judgments of Parliament. Yet, here too the departure from traditional forms of` `statutory 
interpretation’ may be less than is assumed, with judicial discretion in certain respects 
reduced rather than increased. Some commentators make it seem that any failure not to 
follow the literal letter of the law must involve the undermining of legislative supremacy and 
with it political constitutionalism.
75
 However, as I noted in section 1, it has always been the 
case that ‘statutory interpretation’ has involved courts in clarifying unclear or ambiguous 
terms, correcting drafting errors, and overcoming incoherent or unintelligible provisions that 
are irreconcilable with the rest of the statute. With the best will in the world, one cannot hope 
to eradicate all such linguistic problems. Nor can legislators be expected to foresee all the 
potential cases and circumstances their legislation may be applied to. As a result, they often 
use language, such as ‘reasonable’, and employ general rules rather than specific standards 
with the intention of giving judges a degree of discretion that will enable them to tailor 
legislation to the peculiarities and particular or special features of a given case. It would be 
impossible to rule out such discretion and replace it with a mechanical application of the law 
except in the crudest imaginable way, such as a two strikes and you’re out rule, that excludes 
drawing the various distinctions between cases that are generally seen as necessary to avoid 
unjust and dysfunctional outcomes.
76
 Any attempt to overcome this problem by writing all 
these distinctions into the law would necessarily give judges discretion to choose which ones 
applied. Even then, it would be hard to imagine that every eventuality could be anticipated.
77
 
 However, none of the above need mean judicial discretion is totally unconstrained. 
Any type of constitutionalist must believe it possible for one reason or another that judges 
can be bound by law – at least in the sense that they feel an obligation to justify what they do 
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by reference to it. A political constitutionalist need simply ask if it is possible to have a 
concept of law that conjoins Convention rights with parliamentary sovereignty in a coherent 
way that might constrain the sorts of legal reasons judges can offer for their decisions. In 
particular, can there be legal norms that constrain judges from simply interpreting the law so 
that it accords with an outcome that they personally believe best realises human rights in the 
case at hand.
78
 I think a broadly legal positivist view, of the democratic kind outlined 
earlier,
79
 holds there can be.
80
 Both the HRA and the other pieces of legislation which are to 
be read alongside it have a common source that renders them legally valid – namely, 
Parliament. Therefore, the grounds of compatibility – or incompatibility - must be those 
stemming from this source within the legislation itself. Under section 19 Parliament will only 
have supplied a limited set of reasons for regarding a given piece of legislation as Convention 
compatible, or possibly none at all, and it is to these that the judge must defer. I shall call this 
a limitation of interpretative `scope’. Alongside it is a limitation of interpretative `sphere’ that 
is related to the activity of judging itself. Judges have a legally constituted role. They are not 
armchair moral philosophers but sit in courts constituted by certain rules and procedures that 
they have a duty to oversee to ensure the trial is conducted fairly and provides justice for the 
litigant. These include such formal rule of law notions as treating like cases alike, acting 
impartially, ensuring all sides have an equal chance to present their case and so on. A 
political constitutionalist holds that it is appropriate for Parliament to decide general 
substantive issues of rights, and to offer legislative resolutions of the disagreements that 
attend them. However, that is compatible with regarding courts as entitled to ensure the 
procedures for passing the law were duly followed and that the judicial process remains fair 
when it comes to applying such rights in practice. The due process, particularly in the court 
room, is their domain, where they can legitimately claim more expertise and authority than 
Parliament.
81
  
Naturally, there are discretionary elements in deciding how the law applies. My point 
is simply that these need not be arbitrary but legally sanctioned to be deployed with regard to 
a certain set of moral principles, those enumerated in the HRA, and in conformity with the 
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rationale of existing law (its `scope’) and the norms of the judicial role (as applying to the 
`sphere’ of the court and related procedural issues) – with a legal duty to say when these 
options cease to be at all plausible because further reasons are needed to resolve the case in a 
rights compatible fashion.  To the extent such legal guidance has Parliament as its source, 
then it will not be the case that section 3 (1) HRA undermines the very notion of 
parliamentary sovereignty by offering a distinct moral test for the existence of law.
82
 Indeed, 
as Sandra Fredman has suggested,
83
 the HRA arguably strengthens Parliament in this regard 
because it directs judges to be guided in their decisions not by vague, permissive social 
sources of morality – such as notions of ‘natural justice’ or an apparently ever expandable 
‘common law’ - but by a specific and democratically enacted list of rights. In fact, the court 
has consistently argued that their post-HRA rights-based review of legislation has legitimacy 
because it accords with the express will of Parliament that they interpret the law with regard 
to these norms.
84
 In itself, however, simply listing a certain set of rights will not be enough to 
constrain judicial discretion. For these rights still allow for pretty broad and widely differing 
interpretations, and it is the basic claim of political constitutionalists that a democratically 
elected legislature ought to be ultimately responsible for justifying which interpretation 
applies in legislation. The  notions of ‘scope’ and ‘sphere’ enter here, offering crucial 
guidelines. The one constrains the allowable breadth of legislative interpretation to those 
purposes proposed by, or that can be plausibly attributed to, Parliament – the implications of 
which for rights are now spelled out under section 19, the other the domain where judicial 
independence holds sway.  
By implication, these criteria also provide guidelines for addressing the third concern 
noted above. For, they can help determine when interpretation under section 3 should give 
way to a declaration of incompatibility under section 4: namely, on those occasions where the 
court cannot render the law compatible with its reading of Convention rights within the 
judicial ‘sphere’ without going beyond or altering the ‘scope’ of the legislation, thereby  
trespassing on the legislative ‘sphere’ that properly belongs to Parliament. Crucially, this 
division of labour also relates to the application of the doctrine of proportionality, which has 
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been regarded as one of the main innovations introduced by the HRA.  Whereas courts may 
legitimately question whether a measure that restricts an individual’s rights within the judicial 
sphere is proportionate to the legislative goal to be achieved, they should avoid judging 
whether the ‘scope’ per se is proportionate in its effect on Convention rights in cases where 
precisely that issue has been determined by Parliament under section 19 . At most, they 
should employ section 4 to request Parliament reconsider. That leaves the ‘constitutional’ 
determination of rights where a political constitutionalist believes it properly resides – with 
the legislature. Indeed, even advocates of constitutional judicial review under the HRA 
appear to accept that the more a court’s decision touches on matters of legislative `scope’, the 
greater their deference to the executive and legislature should be, allowing at the very least 
for a wider ‘margin of appreciation’ as to what the upholding of rights might require.85 For 
such judgements necessarily involve courts determining the relative weight different interests 
and values contribute to the public good – a matter that, for the political constitutionalist, the 
limitations of the judicial sphere, not least their isolation from the public, however warranted 
for the impartial application of the law, makes them ill-suited to do.  
To see how these criteria might work in practice, let’s consider their implications for 
two leading cases under the HRA - R v.A 
86
 and Ghaidan v. Mendoza.
87
. As I noted at the 
outset, my intention is not to show that these and other cases were decided in ways 
compatible with political constitutionalism, but rather to ask if they could have been and if so 
what that would have involved. All three concerns were potentially at issue, with a number of 
commentators arguing that these cases reveal how the use of section 3 (1) effectively 
undermines the apparent safeguard of parliamentary sovereignty provided by Section 4.
 88
  By 
contrast, I shall argue the foregoing analysis suggests section 3 can be regarded as a justified 
use of judicial discretion within the court’s ‘sphere’. However, R v. A also involved a 
challenge to the legislative `scope’ of the law in question, albeit with attempts by certain 
members of the court to argue otherwise, and so ought to have led at most to a declaration of 
incompatibility under section 4. Instead, Ghaidan can be read as being consistent with a 
reasonable understanding of Parliament’s determination of the relevant law’s ‘scope’ when 
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applied to this case, and as such provides an example of the use of section 3 to address rights 
in the judicial ‘sphere’ that is consistent with a political constitutionalist perspective. 
In R v. A the legislative provision at issue was section 41 of the Youth Justice and 
Criminal Evidence Act of 1999 (YJCEA). Known as the ‘rape shield’ provision, it prohibited 
the admissibility of sexual history evidence except in certain narrowly defined exceptions. 
The intention was to overcome the much criticised section 2 of the Sexual Offences 
(Amendment) Act of 1976, which had left the question of admissibility largely to the 
discretion of the trial judge with the perceived result that the position of complainants had 
frequently been prejudiced by irrelevant and humiliating evidence that had come to deter 
many woman from even bringing rape cases. The point at issue in R v. A was whether this 
provision breached the defendant’s right to a fair trial under Article 6 ECHR by blocking 
evidence of an alleged prior consensual sexual relationship. The House of Lords ruled that 
though prima facie it appeared that the statute offered a reading of the balance between the 
rights of complainants and defendants that was heavily weighted towards the former, it was 
allowed – indeed, incumbent on them ‘in accordance with the will of Parliament’ - to employ 
section 3 (1) HRA to read section 41 (3) (c) YJCEA in such a way as to include an ‘implied 
provision’ that evidence necessary to make the trial compatible with Article 6 ECHR was 
admissible. However, this ‘reading in’ goes beyond the removal of a linguistic confusion or 
error of the kind adverted to above. As such, it appears to trespass on the ‘scope’ of the 
legislation, given that there can be no doubting that Parliament had sought to block the use of 
the very evidence the court now sought to allow. That said, the heart of the case was a 
`sphere’ that could be regarded as rightfully that of the judiciary: namely, the fair conduct of 
a trial. The difficulty lay in the court’s being unable to rectify its perception that injustice 
might arise in this ‘sphere’ without altering the ‘scope’ of the legislation. True, the court did 
attempt to justify its decision by arguing that the ‘reading in’ was to give effect to what it 
believed was the main purpose of the legislation: namely, to ensure rape trials were not 
biased. The court claimed this case had merely revealed that in particular circumstances - 
either unanticipated or not fully considered by the legislature – the laudable desire to protect 
the rights of complainants found in the express wording of the statute  had undermined its 
central ‘implicit’ purpose by jeopardizing the equally compelling rights of defendants.. So, it 
could be said the court’s argument was that their decision had the limited `scope’ of better 
realising the legislature’s purpose, in a `sphere’ where they possessed a competence that has 
always been reserved to them, and doing so in terms that the legislature had itself ordained in 
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the HRA. Certainly, it is significant that the court felt it necessary to legitimatise itself in this 
way. Yet, even if purposive construction has long formed part of statutory interpretation,
 89
  
many commentators feel – rightly in my view -  that in this case  the `scope’ argument was 
overstretched.
90
 Given the court’s justified worries with regard to their ‘sphere’, it would 
have been better to issue a declaration of incompatibility. Indeed, those who defend the 
judgment, do so as part of a more general defence of ‘strong’ forms of constitutional 
review.
91
 
By contrast, Ghaidan, which became the leading case of HRA interpretative 
adjudication, arguably represents a weaker form of review. This case centred on whether 
paragraph 2 (2) of the Rent Act 1977, which allowed a person who had lived with a tenant ‘as 
his or her wife or husband’ to be treated as the tenant’s ‘spouse’ and hence to be entitled to a 
secure tenancy on the death of their partner, could be read as including ‘same-sex’ couples, as 
was believed was required to avoid discrimination on impermissible grounds ‘under Article 
14 taken together with Article 8’ ECHR.  The court decided that Section 3 (1) allowed it to 
do so, thereby overturning a ruling in a pre-HRA case, Fitzpatrick,
92
 that had deemed the 
express wording of ‘husband’ and ‘wife’, to be gender-specific and so rule out homosexual 
couples. Again, at least one Law Lord argued that behind the explicit wording lay a more 
abstract legislative purpose of protecting the interests of people ‘living together in a close and 
stable relationship, and it was this ‘underlying thrust of the legislation’ that made a rights 
compatible interpretation possible.’93 Others likewise argued, also apparently stepping back 
from Lord Steyn’s more radical position in R v. A, that a rights-compatible interpretation 
should (and in this case did) reflect the ‘fundamental features of the legislative scheme’ and 
‘go with the grain’ of the law.94 Given Parliament itself had amended the 1977 Act in 1998 to 
make provision for unmarried heterosexual couples, thereby implying a change of legislative 
focus from ‘official marriage’ to cohabitation, these arguments that the interpretation fell 
within the `scope’ of the legislation seem well founded.  Even in Fitzpatrick the court might 
have decided otherwise. After all, courts had departed from the express wording of statutes in 
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other pre-HRA cases in order to reflect changes in social morality.
95
 Here, the passage of the 
Civil Partnership Bill through Parliament at the time of the case, which would prevent future 
discrimination against same sex couples, and the fact the government did not contest the case, 
further reinforced the acceptability of seeing the interpretation as being compatible in scope 
with Parliament’s underlying purpose. This approach conforms to a standard pattern within 
the HRA case law, whereby even if courts depart from the enacted intention of Parliament 
found in the express terms of a statute, they will refer to its unenacted legislative purpose and 
the more general Parliamentary intention that they use 3 (1) to make legislation Convention 
compatible. As such, their interpretations remain consistent with political constitutionalism.
96
 
It might be objected that even so Ghaidan involved sufficient creativity with regard to 
the reinterpretation of ‘scope’ as to render a declaration of incompatibility more appropriate. . 
The contrast with Bellinger – a case involving the recognition of a marriage by a transsexual 
woman as valid, where a declaration of incompatibility was issued - proves instructive in this 
regard.
97
 Here, the government had accepted a recent ECtHR decision holding the UK to be 
in breach for Articles 8 and 12  for denying legal recognition of gender reassignment;
98
 was 
exploring the many issues to do with its recognition that went beyond the case; and had 
announced new legislation would be available offering a remedy to the plaintiff. As a result, 
interpretation by the Court was unnecessary to get justice for the litigant and would pre-empt 
the work of the legislature. Invoking section 4 did little more than confirm the view that 
Parliament had already taken of the issue. Instead, in Ghaidan interpretation was the only 
way to find justice for the litigant – whose partner, being dead, would not benefit from 
legislative change. So there were strong reasons related to its ‘sphere’ for the court to adopt 
the interpretative route. Moreover, it could do so, as we saw, by following existting 
legislative developments as to the law’s ‘scope’. A parallel point emerges in ReS ,99 where 
the court overrode a ‘reading in’ of the Court of Appeal on the grounds it went against a 
‘fundamental feature’ of the legislation in question, in this case the implementation of care 
orders by local authorities under the Children Act 1989. Here interpretation can be viewed as 
going beyond both the court’s `sphere’ and the law’s `scope’ by essentially proposing a 
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whole new procedure for dealing with care orders to that proposed by Parliament. The 
amendment could be neither catered for within the existing terms of the Act nor related to its 
underlying purpose.  
Of course, notions such as the ‘sphere’ and ‘scope’ of decisions do not provide hard 
and fast rules.  A number of judges have also felt uneasy about using section 3 (1) to depart 
from what they see as the ‘mandatory language used by Parliament’ in order to attribute to it 
a ‘presumed’ intention.100 However, to a degree Parliament has always looked to the courts to 
use their discretion effectively to interpret legislation in ways that seem suited to the case and 
extend or amend it to fill gaps or avoid injustices. Does that make the ritual deference to 
Parliament mere window dressing? Some arguments along these lines suggest that because 
courts are the end users of legislation, and the law cannot prescribe entirely how it should be 
applied, Parliamentary sovereignty is a myth.
101
  I do not believe that need be so. One can 
regard Parliament as the valid source of law in the UK, but accept that judges have always 
had to employ a range of tools - logical, linguistic and moral among them – to make 
reasonable decisions. Some of these tools are needed to make sense of the law in a given 
case, others to indicate where the law fails to make sense and needs supplementing from 
other, less binding, sources, such as positive morality or the exercise of judicial moral and 
political judgment. What judges are doing in referring back to Parliament is recognising the 
need to validate their views in a given way. They can distinguish good or bad laws from good 
or bad judgments about laws, and appropriately see Parliament as the forum where, despite 
our disagreement about rights, we can seek to resolve them in authoritative ways. Having law 
based criteria for determining the merits of law will naturally strengthen the confidence with 
which judges use them. Effectively that is what the HRA does by making the ECHR part of 
domestic law. Yet it is perfectly coherent for judges to say they acknowledge their force of 
Convention rights as legal standards because Parliament has authorised them to do so, and 
that to see Parliament as the ultimate arbitrator of whether or not they apply, and to the 
degree that is possible through general laws, of how. 
102
 So conceived, judicial interpretation 
post-HRA would be more solidly in line with Parliamentary sovereignty than it was before. 
 
Conclusion 
                                                 
100
 E.g. Lord Bingham in Secretary of State for the Home Department v. MB [2007] UKHL 46 at para 44. 
101
 E.g. Dyzenhaus, supra note 64. 
 
29 
 
The HRA contains a number of explicit provisions designed to protect Parliamentary 
sovereignty and the UK’s political constitution. Legal constitutionalists have argued not only 
that these provisions ought not to apply – that they are illegitimate and in certain ways 
unconstitutional, but also that they are implausible and impossible to operate in practice. My 
prime aim has not been to show that they do operate, so much as that they could. As I noted, 
legal constitutionalist critics of parliamentary sovereignty regard the court’s deference to this 
doctrine with great scepticism – as either deluded or purely formal and possibly cynical.103 It 
is sometimes assumed that political constitutionalists embrace a similar scepticism regarding 
notions of rights, the rule of law or judicial impartiality. However, at its heart political 
constitutionalism can be regarded as providing a defence against just such scepticism.  
On the one hand, political constitutionalism offers a way of identifying law and 
explaining its authority by associating its source in a democratically elected legislature.
104
 On 
this account, the assurance we have that law reflects our interests and secures our rights and 
that we have good reason to obey it come from its being promulgated and debated by our 
representatives. Far from being sceptical of rights or law, political constitutionalists defend 
both. They merely regard the legislature as the most appropriate forum for seeing rights in the 
round and ensuring their specification in legislation takes into account the full range of 
considerations necessary to promote the public interest. They also see the need for a large 
number of accountable representatives to agree on a settled law as a means for preventing 
arbitrary rule by any one person or persons.  
On the other hand, that does not involve any scepticism about courts – merely that 
legislation and adjudication involve different qualities. Judges have responsibility for and 
expertise in issues of fair process that form part of their ‘sphere’ and in assuring the law is 
appropriate to its ‘scope’ or purpose with regard to a given litigant. These are issues that 
cannot be fully addressed at the legislative level, which is too remote from the peculiar 
circumstances that surround a particular case. But by the same token, courts are in their 
nature too narrow in focus and as forums to deal adequately with the issue of deciding a 
collective policy on rights that looks at the myriad ways different rights interact.  They lack 
the informational and legitimacy advantages that come from decision-making by large 
numbers of representatives responsive to the views of millions of electors.  
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The HRA arguably should be read as reinforcing both these features of political 
constitutionalism. Section 19 and the processes that have developed around it reinforce the 
conscientiousness with which Parliament deliberates about rights. Section 3 (1) reinforces the 
rights-based aspects of adjudication. However, courts also have the ability to further reinforce 
Parliament’s responsibilities through section 4 – using this both to signal when they feel 
Parliament might, in the light of a given case, be advised to think again, or where they believe 
the executive may have overstepped their authority and should be subjected to further 
parliamentary scrutiny. 
The division of labour here accords with that Locke gave for moving from the state of 
nature to civil society and that lies at the heart of the ‘separation of powers’ that he first 
began to theorise. Namely, that civil society provides the lack of a known and settled law 
‘allowed by common consent to be the Standard of Right and Wrong and the common 
measure to decide all controversies between them’, and ‘a known and indifferent Judge, with 
Authority to determine all differences according to the established Law.’ 105  Parliament 
offers the mechanism for establishing a settled law through common consent, the judiciary an 
indifferent Judge. By contrast, the legal constitutionalist risks conflating rights, law and 
legislation with judicial adjudication. Meanwhile, they offer no clear mechanism of a kind 
equivalent to electoral accountability to explain why we should not see their assurances that 
judges are not deciding in arbitrary ways but according to the higher constitutional law 
offered by rights as anything but formal pieties. After all, judges disagree on what these 
rights require yet need not seek to reconcile their disagreements in ways that might obtain 
‘common consent’, and the higher courts allow no challenge to their decisions. Rights-based 
constitutional review by courts thereby replaces the sovereignty of Parliament with the 
sovereignty of judicial monarchs, returning us to what Locke regarded as worse than the state 
of nature – a condition where the Ruling Power governed by ‘extemporary Dictates and 
undetermined Resolutions’, the ‘unlimited Decrees of their sudden thoughts, or unrestrain’d, 
and till that moment unknown Wills.’ In this way, scepticism about the possibility of a 
political constitution turns into scepticism about constitutionalism itself. And so we come 
back to the opening apparent paradox, the resolution of which arises in the British 
Constitution remaining true to its history in successfully combining both the separation of 
powers and a bill of rights not despite but because of parliamentary sovereignty. 
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